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Albert Lautman: Dialectics in Mathematics 
Albert Lautman (1908-1944) is a rare example of a twentieth-century philosopher whose 
engagement with contemporary mathematics goes beyond the ‘foundational’ areas of 
mathematical logic and set theory.  He insists that (what were in his day) the new 
mathematics of topology, abstract algebra, class field theory and analytic number theory 
have a philosophical significance that distinguishes them from the mathematics of earlier 
eras.  Specifically, these new areas of mathematics reveal underlying dialectical 
structures not found in earlier mathematics.  In a series of short papers and two longer 
theses (Essay on the unity of the mathematical sciences in their current development and 
Essay on the notions of structure and existence in mathematics1), Lautman argues this 
claim from a philosophical perspective rooted in certain of the later dialogues of Plato.  
However, Lautman was not satisfied with Plato’s conception of the relation between 
dialectical Ideas and the matter in which they are realised.  In one of his last papers, ‘New 
research on the dialectical structure of mathematics’2, Lautman bolsters his Platonism 
with an appeal to Heidegger’s ‘ontological’ distinction between phenomenology and 
science.3  We may therefore regard this paper as the most advanced expression available 
of Lautman’s philosophy of mathematics.   
In this paper, I shall first explore Lautman’s conception of dialectics by a consideration 
of his references to Plato and Heidegger.  I shall then compare the dialectical structures 
that he found in contemporary mathematics with the model that emerges from his 
philosophical sources.  I shall argue that the structures that he discovered in mathematics 
are richer than his Platonist model suggests, and that Heidegger’s ‘ontological’ 
distinction is less useful than Lautman seemed to believe.  
Plato 
In his major case-studies, Lautman developed a picture of modern mathematics (that is, 
mathematics in the early twentieth century) as the expression or realisation of 
fundamental conceptual oppositions (such as continuous/discontinuous, global/local, 
finite/infinite, symmetric/anti-symmetric).4  He referred to the opposing terms as 
‘notions’; dialectical ‘Ideas’ envisage possible relations between such pairs of dialectical 
notions (pp. 242-3).  This terminology is a conscious reference to Plato, and he is careful 
to distinguish his appeal to Plato from ‘Platonism’ as philosophers of mathematics 
usually use the term.  In philosophy of mathematics, ‘Platonism’ usually denotes the view 
that mathematical objects exist independently of the thought and talk of mathematicians.  
                                                 
1
 Lautman 2006.  Henceforth, page-numbers refer to the 2006 Vrin edition of Lautman’s complete works.   
2
 Pp. 235-257.  First published in 1939 in a series edited by Jean Cavaillès and Raymond Aron. 
3
 As expressed in Heidegger’s 1928 lecture Vom Wesen des Grundes.  Quotations here are from McNeill’s 
1998 translation On the Essence of Ground.  Lautman quotes Corbin’s 1938 French translation. 
4
 This list is drawn from the two long essays.  In ‘New Research…’ he offers a slightly different list of 
dialectical pairs, “wholes and parts, situational and intrinsic properties, basic domains and objects defined 
on these domains, formal systems and their models, etc..”  Op. Cit. p. 243 
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Lautman insisted that this was a misreading of Plato (p. 230); in any case, this kind of 
‘Platonism’ is not Lautman’s view.5   
Lautman never quotes Plato directly, and he mentions just three Platonic texts: Philebus, 
the Sophist (twice), and Timaeus (twice).  Scholars usually count these among the ‘later’ 
dialogues of Plato (though the Sophist is continuous with the Theaetetus and implicitly 
refers to the Parmenides—both ‘middle period’ dialogues).  What matters for our 
purpose is that Plato’s ‘theory of forms’ is largely absent from his later works.  The 
‘Ideas’ in the later dialogues are not blueprints for material objects.  Similarly, Lautman’s 
mathematical Platonism was not a ‘copy-theory’.  As he points out, we might think of 
material reality as inchoate matter somehow shaped into material copies of non-material 
‘forms’, but this model cannot apply to the relation between mathematical theories and 
the dialectical ideas that (in Lautman’s term) ‘dominate’ them (p. 238).   
The Sophist 
In a short paper of 1937 called ‘Axiomatics and the method of division’6, Lautman refers 
to Philebus and the Sophist together: 
The movement from so-called ‘elementary’ notions to abstract notions does 
not … appear as the subsumption of the particular under the general, but 
rather as the division or analysis of a ‘mixture’ which tends to yield simple 
notions in which this mixture participates.  It is, therefore, not the Aristotelian 
logic of genus and species at work here, but the Platonic method of division, 
as taught in the Sophist and Philebus, in which the unity of Being is a unity of 
composition and a starting-point in the search for principles that are unified in 
Ideas.7   
The Sophist is a discussion between a young man, Theaetetus, and a stranger from Elea, 
“a comrade of the circle of Parmenides and Zeno, and a man very much a philosopher” 
(216A).  The initial question is whether the words ‘sophist’, ‘statesman’ and 
‘philosopher’ name one, two or three types of thing, and what that thing is or those things 
are.  The nameless stranger asks for an “interlocutor [who] submits to guidance easily” 
(217D); Socrates proposes young Theaetetus.  Thus, Plato allows the unnamed 
philosopher to develop his position at length without having to fend off a Socratic 
interrogation (this is a feature of Plato’s later works; in the eponymous dialogue, Timaeus 
has the floor to himself after the preliminary civilities).  Thereafter, Socrates vanishes 
                                                 
5
 « Dans le débat ouvert entre formalistes et intuitionnistes,… les mathématiciens ont pris l’habitude de 
désigner sommairement sous le nom de platonisme toute philosophie pour laquelle l’existence d’un être 
mathématique est tenue pour assuré… c’est là une connaissance superficielle du platonisme... » (p. 230).   
6
 L’axiomatique et la méthode de division (pp. 69-80). 
7
 « Le passage des notions dites ‘élémentaires’ aux notions abstraits ne se présente donc pas comme une 
subsomption du particulier sous le général mais come la division ou l’analyse d’un ‘mixte’ qui tend à 
dégager les notions simples auxquelles ce mixte participe.  Ce n’est donc pas la logique aristotélicienne, 
celle des genres et des espèces qui intervient ici, mais la méthode platonicienne de division, telle que 
l’enseignent le Sophiste et le Philèbe pour laquelle l’unité de l’Être est une unité de composition et un point 
de départ vers la recherche des principes qui s’unissent dans les Idées. »  (pp. 78-9)   
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from the text, so we do not have the luxury of inferring Plato’s view from Socrates’ 
words.   
The Eleatic philosopher proceeds by division, that is, by making one distinction after 
another.  He illustrates this technique with the term ‘angler’.  He first distinguishes 
gathering arts from manufacturing arts; then the gathering arts are divided into trading 
and ‘mastering’ or getting the better of; getting the better of divides into competition and 
hunting; hunting divides according to quarry (animal or other); animals swim or walk; 
swimming animals divide into water-fowl and fish; fishing divides into trapping (with 
nets, traps, etc.) and striking; striking divides into striking down with a trident and up 
with a hook.  The resulting tree of categories is his account of ‘angler’.  He then proceeds 
to apply the same technique to the term ‘sophist’, and this discussion occupies the 
remainder of the dialogue.  The Eleatic philosopher develops several different accounts 
of ‘sophist’ (231D-E), which leads to a methodological discussion, including a debate 
about the possibility of numbering non-beings (238B).  The discussion refers to itself, 
because Theodorus introduced the Eleatic stranger as a philosopher, presumably in virtue 
of his logical technique (253C).8  But if the method of division turns out to be merely a 
spurious word-game, then perhaps he is a sophist.  Certainly, his choices of divided 
categories seem arbitrary.  For example, he might have divided fishing according to 
whether or not bait is used, in which case trident-fishing and net-fishing would have been 
divided from angling and the use of baited traps.  Young Theaetetus submits to the 
philosopher’s guidance rather too easily, and certainly more easily than Socrates would 
have done. 
Whatever Plato’s intent in giving an unnamed, generic Eleatic philosopher an easy ride, 
Lautman takes the method of division as an unproblematic technique, and makes no 
mention of its proper companion, the ‘method of collection’.  In the text immediately 
before the excerpt quoted above, Lautman runs through a list of mixtures, that is, 
mathematical items that ‘participate’ in two heterogeneous categories.  Namely: 
arithmetical equality is the only equivalence relation such that the number of equivalence 
classes equals the cardinality of the base domain; the idea of multiplication refers both to 
the creation of arithmetical products and to the idea of operators on a domain; unity can 
be thought of either as the unit element of a ring of numbers or as the identity element in 
a domain of operators; the length of a segment depends on the size of the segment but at 
the same time depends on a convention; absolute value in classical algebra includes the 
notion of ordering but also the notion of the completeness of a field.  He goes on to claim 
that some of these mixtures (arithmetical equality; multiplication; absolute value) are 
examples of the dialectical relation between the intrinsic and relational properties of 
mathematical objects (pp. 78-9).  He then suggests that, “the distinction thus established 
at the heart of a single concept between the intrinsic properties of an object … and its 
potential for action [on other objects] seems to resemble the Platonic distinction between 
the Same and the Other…”9.  For Lautman, then, these mathematical items (equality, 
                                                 
8
 But see Trevaskis’ (1967) argument that there is more to the philosopher’s technique than the method of 
division. 
9
 « La distinction qui s’établit ainsi au sein d’une même notion entre les propriétés intrinsèques d’un être ou 
d’une notion et ses possibilités d’action nous semble s’apparenter à la distinction platonicienne du Même et 
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multiplication, unity, length and absolute value) all have, in some sense, one foot in each 
of two camps.  We shall see this pattern again in the fifth chapter of the Essay on the 
notions of structure and existence in mathematics, in which Lautman explores another 
collection of mathematical ‘mixtures’.  Notice, though, that the pairs of notions in this list 
are not pairs of conceptual opposites.  He has this in common with the Eleatic 
philosopher; swimming is not the opposite of walking, nor is fish the opposite of fowl.  
The fact that these pairs are not conceptual opposites raises the question why the Eleatic 
philosopher divides categories into pairs (rather than triples, quadruples, etc.), with all the 
resulting awkwardness and arbitrariness.  In another late work that Lautman mentions, 
Timaeus, Plato divides living creatures into four classes according to habitat: gods in 
heaven, birds in the air, land animals and water animals (39-40).  Similarly in Philebus, 
when Socrates describes the method of division he requires only that a category be 
divided into a finite number of sub-categories (16D).  The view that dialectics relates 
notions in pairs is indeed present in the Sophist, but only in the figure of the generic 
Eleatic philosopher.  It does not seem to have been Plato’s doctrine. 
The final reference to the Sophist is rather indirect.  Lautman ends the Essay on the 
notions of structure and existence in mathematics with a gesture towards the thought that 
there is a developmental order among dialectical Ideas and from Ideas to mathematics.  
Lautman appeals to the works of Oscar Becker and Julius Stenzel on number in Plato and 
Aristotle.  Lautman supplies this diagram, taken from Stenzel.  Iterations of the Ideas 
‘one’ and ‘pair’ produce ‘Idea-numbers’ (represented by the tree-diagrams), which in turn 
engender arithmetical numbers 
(represented by the black dots).  
Lautman’s discussion is confused and 
inconclusive.  He reproduces this 
diagram in the main text and in the 
footnotes, and mentions some 
reservations on Becker’s part without 
discussing them (p. 230 fig. 9).  In any 
case, as Lautman acknowledges, Becker and Stenzel were both reading Plato through 
Aristotle (this was also Heidegger’s procedure).10  Having made this gesture, Lautman 
then turns to the relationship between mathematics and physics.  The brief, inconclusive 
discussion with its pointlessly repeated diagram suggests some haste and dissatisfaction 
on Lautman’s part. 
Philebus 
Lautman mentions Philebus once, in the quotation given above, as a source for the 
method of division.  In this dialogue, Philebus, one of Socrates’ young companions, holds 
that the good for man is pleasure.  Socrates sets out to contest this, and to argue that 
intelligence (including knowledge and judgement) is better than pleasure.  Before 
proceeding to his argument, Socrates makes a methodological digression.  He describes 
                                                                                                                                                 
de l’Autre qui se retrouvent dans l’unité de l’être. » p. 79.  (Translation note: this translation is a little free 
in order to preserve Lautman’s special sense of ‘notion’).   
10
 Heidegger (2003) p. 8.  Lautman was not the only one to find Stenzel’s reading of Plato on arithmetic 
more suggestive than clear.  See Cornford (1924); Shorey (1924).  
 - 5 - 
the method of division (16C-17A), and insists that scientific understanding of a topic 
requires knowledge of the structure generated by successive distinctions.  Unlike the 
Eleatic philosopher, Socrates allows that a category may divide into more than two 
subclasses; all he insists is that the number of subclasses should be finite (16D). 
Early in the dialogue, Socrates points out that a life of pure intellectual activity is not 
suitable for men (21E).  The good life for men must include some sensuous enjoyment as 
well as intellectual activity—though this being Plato, the intellectual side has priority.  
The crucial point is that the good for men is a mixture of heterogeneous elements 
(sensual and intellectual).  This would present a paradox, if the method of division had 
the Aristotelian purpose of establishing a taxonomy.  In the ‘Aristotelian logic of genus 
and species’, an object that seems to belong to two different species would be a 
counterexample to the taxonomy (as, for example, the duck-billed platypus threatens the 
category ‘mammal’).  In contrast, a Platonic system of Ideas is somehow prior to and 
independent of the objects that participate in those Ideas.  An object can participate in 
more than one Idea (for example, a physical object might be both red and round).  This 
mixing of Ideas occurs in other later dialogues.  It is one of the principal explanatory 
motifs in the physics of Timaeus (34-35, 59-61), and we have already seen it in the 
Sophist.   
For our purposes, the significant outcome of Philebus is that every human life must 
embody a mixture of sensual and intellectual goods.  Precisely which goods and how they 
connect will vary from life to life.  Perhaps someone’s enjoyment of wine will develop an 
intellectual aspect as connoisseurship.  To take a different example, intellectual work may 
offer some pleasures and satisfactions (though this is not, in Plato, the reason why it is 
good).  One might imagine a life in which intelligence and pleasure were entirely 
separate departments, though it is hard to imagine desiring such an existence.  Every 
human life will embody this dialectic in some way, and on philosophical examination 
will disclose it.  Lives that lack one or other element must show that lack as an 
inadequacy or discontent.  Indeed, we would need this dialectic of the sensual and the 
intellectual in order to understand the distempers and changes within a particular life.  
The background dialectical structure explains why a life given excessively to either 
sensuous pleasures or intellectual goods would be unsatisfactory. 
Philebus, then, gives us an ethical analogy of Lautman’s account of dialectical Ideas in 
mathematics.  In Lautman’s terminology, pleasure and intelligence are ‘notions’ and the 
possibility of relations between them is an ‘Idea’.  This dialectical structure does not 
specify which pleasures and thoughts will actually obtain.  As Lautman says of 
mathematical Ideas, “As they are merely sketches of eventual positions, [Ideas] do not 
necessarily entail the existence of particular beings capable of sustaining the relations that 
the Ideas outline.”11  These notions come into relation through the interplay of particular 
thoughts and pleasures, and there is no predicting the detail of that interplay from the bare 
dialectical structure.  The wine connoisseur’s knowledge inflects his pleasure in boozing.  
Pleasure and intelligence relate quite differently (but no less intimately) in the rare but 
                                                 
11
 « Étant seulement dessin de positions éventuelles, elles n’entraînent pas forcément l’existence d’êtres 
susceptibles de soutenir entre eux les relations qu’elles ébauchent. »  p. 243. 
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precious moments of insight in the work of a scientist.  Similarly, Lautman maintains 
there is an indefinite variety of ways in which any dialectical relation between notions 
might manifest itself in actual mathematics, and it is not the business of philosophers to 
attempt to predict or circumscribe these relations (p. 229).   
Timaeus  
Lautman’s two references to Timaeus (pp. 231, 267) both remind us that for Plato, the 
creation of a material world is possible only if there is already a ‘geometrically ordered 
receptacle’ called ‘place’.12  Crucially, different objects may (at different times) occupy 
the same place.  Thus, ‘place’ depends for its intelligibility on an anterior dialectical pair: 
same/other.  As we saw above, Lautman regards ‘the distinction… between the intrinsic 
properties of an object … and its potential for action’ on other objects as an expression of 
the same/other relation.  In both cases, reference to Timaeus enables Lautman to shift 
from philosophy of mathematics to philosophy of physics.  Lautman argues that the 
natural world is mathematically intelligible because the same dialectical structures 
underlie both physics and mathematics.  He offers enantiomorphic crystals as an example 
of a physical phenomenon in which dialectical opposites (in this case, symmetry and 
dissymmetry) are ‘mixed’.  (This paper will not further discuss Lautman’s philosophy of 
physics.)  Here, as in his allusion to Stenzel’s work on number, Lautman is trying to 
illustrate his thought that the intelligibility of mathematics and physics requires a prior 
dialectical order.  In both cases, his exposition stumbles over Plato’s inability to say what 
‘dialectical priority’ means. 
For Lautman, then, the method of division reveals dialectical ‘notions’ (in his special 
sense of the word), and with them the Ideas of relations between these notions.  However, 
Lautman does not offer sequences of distinctions.  His notions do not form tree-shaped 
accounts like those of the philosopher in the Sophist.  As the quotation at the head of this 
section suggests, what he takes from these later dialogues is the thought that a particular 
can participate in heterogeneous categories simultaneously.  In some of his examples, the 
notions ‘mixed’ in a mathematical theory are merely different (such as ordinal and 
closure), while in others they are opposites (as in the cases where he sees mixtures of 
finite and infinite mathematics). 
Plato does not suffice 
Lautman scattered references to Plato throughout his works; Heidegger, on the other hand, 
does not feature anywhere in his writing other than the discussion in ‘New research on 
the dialectical structure of mathematics’ and implicitly in some brief remarks in the 
conclusion to Essay on the notions of structure and existence.13  We may therefore 
suppose that Lautman turned to Heidegger in order to solve a particular problem in his 
                                                 
12
 « …le réceptacle d’une qualification géométrique » (p. 231 ; translation note : the more literal 
« receptacle of a geometric qualification » makes little sense) ; « le lieu » (p. 267).  See Timaeus §§48-9. 
13
 Pp. 228-9.  The sole exception is in a short piece of 1933 ‘Considérations sur la logique mathématique’.  
But here he discusses the use that the intuitionists made of phenomenology and makes no commitment of 
his own: “Les intuitionnistes se rattachent par là aux phénoménologues disciples de Husserl, Heidegger, et 
Oscar Becker.” (p. 43). 
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overall Platonism.14  Moreover, the Heideggerian text that he refers to, On the Essence of 
Ground, is a meditation on the ‘ontological difference’ between the ‘ontic’ concepts 
employed in the sciences and the underlying ‘ontological’ concepts disclosed by 
phenomenology.  The relation between dialectics and mathematics was clearly 
problematic for Lautman.  On one hand, he was committed to his Platonist view that 
Ideas are somehow prior to the matter that they dominate, and which participates in them.  
In a talk given in 1937, Lautman claims that, “The reality inherent in mathematical 
theories is due to their participation in an ideal reality which dominates mathematics, but 
which cannot be known except through mathematics”15.  He knew that the logical 
empiricist mainstream would regard his view as a mystification, “as obscure as the 
mystical beliefs of primitives in the participation of subjects in objects of which Mr. 
Lévy-Bruhl speaks”16.  He retorts that, on the contrary, empiricism (whether Aristotelian 
or Viennese) separates thought from experience and thus makes a mystery of the fact that 
we find nature mathematically intelligible.  Moreover, a tautological view of mathematics 
separates the discovery of truth from the quest for reality (since tautologies do not require 
reference to any reality).  Empiricism, he thought, deprives science of its spiritual dignity 
and value.  Thus, it is scientifically and spiritually vital to insist on the reality of 
dialectical notions and the Ideas of their possible relations prior to their realisation in 
particular cases.  On the other hand, notions only come into relations with each other 
when ‘mixed’ in particulars.  Towards the end of the Essay on the notions of Structure 
and Existence, Lautman characterises Ideas of possible relations between notions as 
‘problems’ or ‘questions’ and actual (realised) relations between notions as ‘logical 
schemas’: 
The logical schemas that we have described are not prior to their realisation at 
the heart of a theory; what is lacking from … the extra-mathematical intuition 
of the urgency of a logical problem is that it must have material to dominate, 
for the idea of possible relations to give birth to a scheme of real relations.17 
Before the development of the mathematical theory that solves the problem, there is only 
“the experience of the urgency of problems”.18   However, this formulation makes it 
sound as if we are concerned with the psychology of mathematicians.  That is not what 
Lautman had in mind.  In the introduction to the Essay on structure, he concludes a 
discussion of Hilbert and Brunschvicg by insisting that, “Between logical deduction and 
                                                 
14
 Which is not to suggest that Lautman chose Heidegger arbitrarily, given his references to Plato; 
Heidegger prefaced Being and Time with a quotation from the Sophist (244a), and he devoted his lectures 
of 1924-5 to that same dialogue. 
15
 « La réalité inhérente aux théories mathématiques leur vient de ce qu’elles participent à une réalité idéale 
qui est dominatrice par rapport à la mathématique, mais qui n’est connaissable qu’à travers elle. » pp. 67-8. 
16
 « …aussi obscures que les croyances mystiques à la participation du sujet à l’objet chez les primitifs dont 
parle M. Lévy-Bruhl. » p. 64. 
17
 « Les schémas logiques que nous avons décrits ne sont pas antérieurs à leur réalisation au sein d’une 
théorie ; il manque en effet à ce que nous appelons plus haut l’intuition extra-mathématique de l’urgence 
d’un problème logique, une matière à dominer pour que l’idée de relations possibles donne naissance au 
schéma de relations véritables. » p. 229. 
18
 « Le seul élément a priori que nous concevions est donné dans l’expérience de cette urgence des 
problèmes… » p. 229. 
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the psychology of the mathematician, there must be space for an intrinsic characterisation 
of reality”.19   
What he requires, then, is a philosophical idiom in which this feeling for the urgency of a 
problem is more than a mere feeling.  For, if this sense of urgency is no more than a 
psychological urge, then its content cannot have the logical significance that Lautman’s 
Platonism requires.  At the same time, this ‘extra-mathematical intuition of the urgency 
of a logical problem’ cannot be a mysterious sensitivity to a world of Ideas that exist 
prior to the activity of mathematicians.  We have already seen that he rejects that kind of 
naïve Platonism.  It is to fill this need that Lautman turns to Heidegger. 
Heidegger20 
Lautman was familiar with Being and Time, (see his reference to it on p. 240) but he 
appeals to a much shorter work of Heidegger’s: On the Essence of Ground (1928).  In 
this lecture, Heidegger tries to clarify his distinction between ‘ontological’ and ‘ontic’ (or 
equivalently, between ‘being’ and ‘beings’).  He does this through a meditation on the 
history of philosophy that resists summary, but the central thought is as follows.  From 
Kant, we learn that metaphysics (or in Heidegger’s terminology, ‘ontology’) is not 
directly concerned with what the world is like ‘in itself’.  Rather, ontology primarily 
reveals the deep structure of how we go at the world and go on in it.  In this exposition, 
‘the world’ should be read in something like the sense it has when one says that people 
who routinely practice sympathetic magic ‘live in a different world’ from people who 
routinely pursue their ends by modern scientific means.  In this sense, only humans live 
in ‘the world’.  Cats and dogs occupy physical space, but they do not have a deep and 
largely inarticulate sense of what the world is like and how it works that shapes and 
guides their activities.  The crucial feature of humans is that we enquire.  Our questions 
may be practical (such as ‘why is my knee throbbing?’ or ‘will I have to mix some more 
cement to finish this wall?’) or they may be part of an advanced science.  Scientific or not, 
every question has built in some assumptions about the form of the answer.  A sleeper 
woken by a noise might ask, “what’s that?” or “who’s there?” or “did I imagine that?”, 
depending on her expectations and cast of mind.  This is true even of questions that seem 
to make no assumptions, such as “why is there something rather than nothing?”  We did 
not have to ask about things.  We might have asked, “Why is there stuff rather than 
void?”  Scientific disciplines have their characteristic ways of going at the world: the 
modern physicist asks questions in the language of mathematics.  This would be 
unintelligible to earlier students of nature who ‘lived in another world’ in the 
phenomenological sense (even if they understood the mathematics).  Thus, our questions 
always reveal something of the deep structural features of the world as we take it. 
                                                 
19
 « Entre la psychologie du mathématicien et la déduction logique, il doit y avoir place pour une 
caractérisation intrinsèque du réel » p. 129. 
20
 I am grateful to Dr. Nicholas Joll for his unstinting help with my reading of Heidegger.   
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What then of the ‘ontological difference’?  In a passage that Lautman quotes, Heidegger 
declares: 
The prior determination of the being (what-being and how-being) of nature in 
general is anchored in the ‘fundamental concepts’ [Grundbegriffe] of the 
relevant science.  In such concepts, space, place, time, motion, mass, force, 
and velocity are delimited, and yet the essence of time or motion does not 
become an explicit problem.  …  The fundamental concepts of contemporary 
science neither contain the ‘proper’ ontological concepts of the being of those 
beings concerned, nor can such concepts be attained merely through a 
‘suitable’ extension of these fundamental concepts.21 
In other words, even the most fundamental concepts that scientists use are merely ontic.  
The corresponding ontological concepts lie outside the conceptual resources of science.  
Lautman insisted that the same is true of the dialectical notions and ideas that he discerns 
at work within mathematics.   “Dialectic”, he says, “is not part of mathematics, and its 
notions have no connection with the primitive notions of a theory.”22  (p. 242).  Rather, 
dialectic is ontologically prior to mathematics in Heidegger’s sense of ‘ontological’.  In 
the conclusion of Essay on the notions of structure and existence in mathematics, 
Lautman describes his philosophy of mathematics as phenomenological enquiry into the 
extra-mathematical intuition of or concern (souci) with the ‘urgency’ of a logical problem.  
We should read souci here as sorge (concern or care) in the Heideggerian sense.   
Heidegger’s phenomenology is primarily concerned with our habits of mind and 
expectations as revealed in our questions (or rather, in our practices of enquiry).  
However, this enquiry into the structure of our active, questioning subjectivity also 
reveals the order of objective reality.  Heidegger takes from Kant the thought that the 
coherent order of human subjectivity and the coherent order of the world are two sides of 
the same fact.  Somehow, at an inexpressibly deep level, three aspects come together: the 
structure of our subjectivity, our busy activity using things to work on other things and 
the deep structures that we find embodied in the world. 
Lautman’s Heideggerian account of the objectivity of mathematics seems to come to this: 
mathematical theories ‘participate’ in dialectical Ideas, in the sense that they relate 
dialectical notions.  The Ideas pose vague and nebulous questions (in that they suggest 
the possibility of notional relations), to which mathematics supplies precise and detailed 
answers.  In this sense, the Ideas call the mathematical theories into existence (though we 
should not expect to discern the Ideas doing the calling until after the mathematical 
theory is complete.)  Thus, the mathematical theories depend for their objectivity on the 
Ideas.  The Ideas are objective in the sense that they are part of the deep structure of our 
engagement with the world, which means that they are part of the deep structure of us, or, 
what comes to the same thing, they are part of the deep structure of our world.  Since our 
world is the only one we know, we may as well say that they are part of the deep 
                                                 
21
 1998 pp. 104-5.  Quoted by Lautman p. 241. 
22
 « La dialectique ne fait pas partie des mathématiques, et ses notions sont sans rapport avec les notions 
primitives d’une théorie. » p. 242. 
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structure of the world, so long as we remember that this insight is ontological, not ontic.  
It belongs to phenomenology, not to science.   
Lautman’s mathematical examples 
Having sketched Lautman’s view abstractly, I shall now consider his mathematical 
examples. The first of Lautman’s two theses (On the unity of the mathematical sciences) 
takes as its starting point a distinction that Hermann Weyl made in his 1928 work on 
group theory and quantum mechanics.  Weyl distinguished between ‘classical’ 
mathematics, which found its highest flowering in the theory of functions of complex 
variables, and the ‘new’ mathematics represented by (for example) the theory of groups 
and abstract algebras, set theory and topology.23  For Lautman, the ‘classical’ 
mathematics of Weyl’s distinction is essentially analysis, that is, the mathematics that 
depends on some variable tending towards zero: convergent series, limits, continuity, 
differentiation and integration.  It is the mathematics of arbitrarily small neighbourhoods, 
and it reached maturity in the nineteenth century.  On the other hand, the ‘new’ 
mathematics of Weyl’s distinction is ‘global’; it studies the structures of ‘wholes’.24  
Algebraic topology, for example, considers the properties of an entire surface (how many 
holes?) rather than aggregations of neighbourhoods.  Having quoted and illustrated 
Weyl’s distinction, Lautman re-draws it: 
In contrast to the analysis of the continuous and the infinite, algebraic 
structures clearly have a finite and discontinuous aspect.  Though the 
elements of a group, field or algebra (in the restricted sense of the word) may 
be infinite, the methods of modern algebra usually consist in dividing these 
elements into equivalence classes, the number of which is, in most 
applications, finite.25 
The chief part of Lautman’s ‘unity’ thesis is taken up with four examples26 in which 
theories of modern analysis (that is to say, analysis as practiced in the twentieth century) 
depend in their most intimate details on results and techniques drawn from the ‘new’, 
algebraic side of Weyl’s distinction.  In these four cases, algebra comes to the aid of 
analysis.  Thus, Lautman transforms a broad historical distinction (between the local, 
analytic, continuous and infinitisic mathematics of the nineteenth century, and the new, 
‘global’, synthetic, discrete and finitistic style) into a family of dialectical dyads 
(local/global, analytic/synthetic, continuous/discrete, infinitistic/finitistic).  These pairs 
are not empty oppositions.  They find their content in the details of mathematical theories 
                                                 
23
 2006 pp. 83-84 
24
 Op. Cit. p. 84 
25
 «…en opposition à l’analyse du continu et de l’infini, les structures algébriques ont un aspect nettement 
fini et discontinu.  Quelle que soit l’infinité des éléments qui constituent un groupe, un corps, une algèbre 
(au sens restreint du mot), les méthodes de l’algèbre moderne consistent le plus souvent à imposer à ces 
éléments une division en classes d’éléments équivalents, et à substituer ainsi à un ensemble infini la 
considération d’un nombre de classes qui, dans les applications, est le plus souvent fini. » Op. Cit. pp. 86-7. 
26
 Dimensional decomposition in function theory; non-Euclidian metrics in analytic function theory; 
non-commutative algebras in the equivalence of differential equations; and the use of finite, discontinuous 
algebraic structures to determine the existence of functions of a continuous variable (p. 87). 
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that, though they belong to analysis, sometimes employ a characteristically algebraic 
point of view.  In other words, the methods are algebraic but the results belong to 
analysis.27  By this point, we have left the nineteenth century behind, and are concerned 
with analytic/algebraic ‘mixtures’ in contemporary (twentieth century) mathematics. 
In his other major thesis, Essay on the notions of structure and existence in mathematics, 
Lautman gives his dialectical thought a more philosophical and polemical expression.  
Six chapters compose the body of this second thesis, the first three on ‘structural 
schemas’ (schémas de structure), the second three on ‘origination schemas’ (schémas de 
genèse).  The three structural schemas are: local/global, intrinsic properties/induced 
properties and the (unfortunately titled) ‘ascent to the absolute’.28  The first two of these 
three schemas are pairs of the sort we saw in Lautman’s ‘unity’ thesis.  The ‘ascent to the 
absolute’ is a different sort of pattern; it involves a progress from mathematical objects 
that are in some sense ‘imperfect’, towards an object that is ‘perfect’ or ‘absolute’.  His 
two mathematical examples of this ‘ascent’ are: class field theory, which ‘ascends’ 
towards the absolute class field, and the covering surfaces of a given surface, which 
‘ascend’ towards a simply-connected universal covering surface.  In each case, there is a 
corresponding sequence of nested subgroups (with the trivial subgroup mapping to the 
‘absolute’ class field or surface), which induces a ‘stepladder’ structure on the ‘ascent’.  
(Lautman introduces this idea with a brief discussion of the Galois correspondence, 
pp. 166-168.)  This dialectical pattern is rather different to the others.  The earlier 
examples were of pairs of notions (finite/infinite, local/global, etc.) and neither member 
of any pair was inferior to the other.29  As we saw, Lautman argues that on some 
occasions, finite mathematics offers insight into infinite mathematics (think for example 
of the use of finite integer fields in the study of infinitely numerous natural numbers).  In 
mathematics, the finite is not a somehow imperfect version of the infinite.  Similarly, the 
‘local’ mathematics of analysis may depend for its foundations on ‘global’ topology (as 
Lautman argues p. 85), but the former is not a botched or somehow inadequate version of 
the latter.  Lautman introduces the section on the ‘ascent to the absolute’ by rehearsing 
Descartes’ argument that his own imperfections lead him to recognise the existence of a 
perfect being (God).  Man (for Descartes) is not the dialectical opposite of or alternative 
to God; rather, man is an imperfect image of his creator.  In a similar movement of 
thought, according to Lautman, reflection on ‘imperfect’ class fields and covering 
surfaces leads mathematicians up to ‘perfect’, ‘absolute’ class fields and covering 
surfaces respectively.  In short, the ‘ascent to the absolute’ introduces a different 
dialectical structure from the pairs of notions we saw hitherto.  It has nothing in common 
with the patterns found in the three Platonic dialogues. 
The three origination schemas are titled ‘Essence and existence’, ‘Mixtures’ and ‘On the 
exceptional character of existence’.  In the first two of these chapters, the structure of a 
mathematical domain gives rise to new mathematical objects; in the third chapter, 
                                                 
27
 « …il est possible de retrouver dans les théories modernes de l’analyse les points de vue qui caractérisent 
l’algèbre…théories dont les méthodes sont algébriques  mais les résultats s’étendent à l’analyse.»  p. 121 
28
 La montée vers l’absolu.  The Hegelian resonance of ‘the absolute’ is a red herring; it seems to have 
deceived Bernays (Bernays 1940 p. 20) 
29
 But see also Barot 2003 p. 12.  Recall too that for Plato, the intellectual is superior to the sensual.  
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Lautman considers cases where an object is shown to exist in virtue of exceptional 
properties that distinguish it from an established set of objects.  Lautman does not address 
directly the general question of the metaphysical status of mathematical objects.  He is, 
rather, interested in the way that mathematical structures and objects grow out of already 
existing mathematics.  As he explains, the roles of ‘originating structure’ and ‘created 
object’ are relative; objects that have owe their existence to the structure of another 
domain may themselves come to constitute the originating structure for some further 
class of entities (p. 187).  Part of his purpose is to oppose the view that there is nothing 
more to mathematical existence than the consistency of an axiom system.  Lautman 
spends some time rehearsing the familiar technical difficulties entailed in attempts to 
prove the consistency of a system (pp. 179-187).  But his real claim is that mathematical 
entities do not depend for their existence on apparently arbitrary decisions to explore 
some sets of axioms but not others.  Rather, mathematicians create new mathematical 
structures in the course of answering questions latent in the underlying extra-
mathematical dialectical order.  Here too, the dialectical patterns that he discerns are 
more richly varied than his references to Plato would suggest. 
Blurring the ontological difference  
Lautman concludes the Essay on the notions of structure and existence in mathematics 
with some remarks that, though they do not mention Heidegger by name, are clearly of a 
piece with the explicit discussion of Heidegger in ‘New research’ (228-229).  After a 
brief discussion of Plato (pp. 230-234), Lautman ends his thesis with a statement of his 
credo, which he held to be true of mathematics and physics alike: 
The nature of reality, its structure and the conditions of its origination cannot 
be known except by returning to the Ideas that science embodies in its inner 
relations.30   
 
As we saw, Lautman appeals to Heidegger in order to explain the relation between 
dialectics and mathematics.  The whole point of On the Essence of Ground is to insist on 
the ontological difference, that is, on the distinction between the ontological and the ontic.  
The division of labour between the scientist and the philosopher depends on this 
distinction.  The scientist uses ontic concepts to establish ontic truths; the philosopher 
reveals the corresponding ontology.  Lautman insists on the distinction between dialectics 
and mathematics.  If dialectic tries to find its own solutions to the problems it expresses, 
it will “mimic mathematics with such a collection of subtle distinctions and logical tricks 
that it will be mistaken for mathematics itself”.31  This, he suggests, is the fate of the 
logicism of Frege and Russell.  Dialectical notions and ideas must find expression in 
mathematical examples.  Expression in mathematical examples subjects an Idea to “a 
                                                 
30
 « La nature du réel, sa structure et les conditions de sa genèse ne sont connaissables qu’en remontant aux 
Idées dont la science incarne les liaisons. » p. 234. 
31
 « Une dialectique qui s’engagerait dans la détermination des solutions que ces problèmes logiques 
peuvent comporter, se verrait entraînée à constituer tout un ensemble de distinctions subtiles et d’artifices 
de raisonnement qui imiteraient a ce point les mathématiques, qu’elle se confondrait avec les 
mathématiques elles-mêmes. »  (p. 228). 
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whole train of specifications, limitations and exceptions with which mathematical 
theories are constructed and confirmed”.32  So, for example, we might look at the various 
mathematical concepts of completeness and closure, and recognise in them mathematical 
versions of the vague (and hence presumably dialectical) notion that a complex item 
might be self-sufficient or sui generis.  To recall one of his detailed examples, Lautman 
invites us to see the mathematical relations between the intrinsic and relational properties 
of mathematical objects as a mathematical specification of the dialectic of same and other.   
But now we have a problem.  How are we to distinguish between the legitimate activity 
of seeking mathematical answers to dialectical questions, and the mistaken activity of 
making dialectics imitate mathematics?  After all, historically, mathematics does not have 
fixed borders.  For example, Euler thought that the Königsberg bridges problem lay 
outside mathematics, because “the solution is based on reason alone, and its discovery 
does not depend on any mathematical principle”33.  Formal logic lay outside mathematics 
for over two millennia (if we measure from Aristotle’s Prior Analytics to Boole’s 1847 
Mathematical Analysis of Logic).  Aside from the authority of Heidegger, Lautman’s 
distinction between dialectics and mathematics depends on the “essential insufficiency”34 
of dialectical Ideas, that is, the fact that they cannot be understood except through the 
development of mathematical theory.  However, this is also true of undeveloped or 
primitive mathematical concepts.  The primitive concepts of continuity and infinity posed 
questions that were only properly answered through the contemplation of mathematical 
examples and the articulation of mathematical theories.  For all that, continuity and 
infinity are clearly mathematical concepts, however primitive.  
Lautman’s own examples suggest that the line between dialectics and mathematics is 
neither clear nor stable.  Look again at the diagram he takes from Stenzel.  Lattices were 
not mathematical objects in Plato’s day, but they are now.  Are we to suppose that the 
underlying dialectical structure of Plato’s arithmetic is itself an example of a 
mathematical concept (namely, lattice), which presumably has a dialectical basis of its 
own?  Lautman explicitly rejects such regresses (p. 232). 
The second part of ‘New research on the structure of mathematics’ is a pair of case 
studies that pick up the contrast between analysis and algebra that we first met in Essay 
on the unity of the mathematical sciences.  In that early essay, we saw algebra coming to 
the aid of analysis.  In these two cases, we see analysis (the mathematics of continuity) 
supplying proofs to number theory.  The second case supports Lautman’s argument for 
the unity of mathematics rather well: it is the use of the Riemann zeta-function to 
investigate the density of primes.  The first case is rather artificial: it is Hecke’s proof of 
quadratic reciprocity.  It is artificial because (as Lautman acknowledges) there is no need 
to call on analysis to prove this theorem.  Of Hecke’s proof of quadratic reciprocity, 
Lautman writes:  
                                                 
32
 « Il faut ensuite, pour que l’exemple supporte l’Idée, apporter à celle-ci tout un cortège de précisions, de 
limitations et d’exceptions où s’affirment et se construisent les théories mathématiques. » p. 243. 
33
 Euler, Opera Omnia (4), I, letter 590, translated by Adrian Hollis and quoted from Wilson 2008 p. 15.  
Euler wondered whether it might be what Leibniz meant by ‘geometry of position’. 
34
 « Insuffisance essentielle » p. 243. 
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The analytic tool, that is to say, functions, serves to demonstrate an 
arithmetical result because the structure of the tool and that of the result both 
participate in the same dialectical structure, which poses the problem of the 
reciprocity of roles between mutually inverse elements.35   
This presents two problems for the distinction between dialectics and mathematics.  First, 
reciprocity is a kind of symmetry.  The symmetry that obtains between these mutually 
inverse elements hardly requires the apparatus of group theory, but it is, nevertheless, a 
mathematical concept, as indeed are the relata.  Second, the proper relationship between 
dialectics and mathematics appears to have been reversed.  In a letter to the 
mathematician Maurice Fréchet, Lautman explained: 
It is insofar as a mathematical theory supplies an answer to a dialectical 
problem that is definable but not resolvable independently of mathematics 
that the theory seems to me to participate, in the Platonic sense, in the Idea 
with regard to which it stands as an Answer to a Question.36    
In principle, then, dialectics stands to mathematics as question to answer, but here a 
mathematical question (why does this body of analytic theory serve to prove that 
arithmetical result?) gets a dialectical answer.  In any case, ‘participates in the same 
dialectical structure as’ is a symmetric relation, but the tool-result relation is not.  He 
gives other examples in ‘new research’ in which (he claims) “the convergence of 
different mathematical theories results from the affinity of their dialectical structures”37, 
but he elsewhere gives examples of mathematical theories that share dialectical structures 
(such as all the same/other examples) but do not show any sign of convergence.   
In short, the claim that science and phenomenology treat of different concepts collapses 
in mathematical practice.38  Symmetry (for example) is a mathematical concept, but it can 
also function as a dialectical notion in Lautman’s sense—it is one of the notions that 
shape our questions.  If it does so explicitly, it may also function as a heuristic in the 
sense of Polya.  Lautman does not mention heuristics; rather, he insists that we should not 
expect to discern a dialectical question in advance of arriving at its mathematical answer.  
However, this overlooks the fact (which Lautman elsewhere insists on) that the same 
dialectical notions and Ideas may feature in different mathematical theories.  As a notion 
or Idea recurs in various mathematical theories, it may become an explicit part of the 
mathematical culture and thus begin to function heuristically.  Recognising that a concept 
can serve on either side of the dialectical/mathematical distinction would be consistent 
                                                 
35
 « l’outil analytique, c’est-à-dire les fonctions, sert à démontrer un résultat arithmétique, parce que la 
structure de l’outil et celle du résultat participent l’une et l’autre d’une même structure dialectique, celle 
que pose le problème de la réciprocité de rôles entre éléments inverses l’un de l‘autre. » p. 248. 
36
 « C’est dans la mesure où une théorie mathématique apporte une réponse à un problème dialectique 
définissable mais non résoluble indépendamment des mathématiques que la théorie me paraît participer, au 
sens de Platon, à l’Idée vis-à-vis de laquelle elle est dans la même situation que la Réponse par rapport à la 
Question. » p. 260. 
37
 « la convergence des théories mathématiques différentes résulte de leur affinité de structure dialectique. » 
p. 250. 
38
 For an independent argument with a similar conclusion, see Barot 2003 pp. 14-17. 
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with what we find in the later Plato.  The ‘same/other’ dyad may have a deep ontological 
role, lending intelligibility to concepts as diverse as ‘place’ and ‘intrinsic/extrinsic’, but it 
also has a function in unremarkable empirical questions like “Is that the same dog as I 
saw yesterday?”.  Consequently, if we wish Lautman to enrich our own philosophy, the 
first move should be to give up the ‘ontological distinction’.  This thought can even find 
some support in Heidegger.  In a 1936 lecture ‘Modern Science, Metaphysics and 
Mathematics’, he writes:  
The greatness and superiority of natural science during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries rests in the fact that all the scientists were philosophers.  
They understood that there are no mere facts, but that a fact is only what it is 
in the light of the fundamental conception… the present leaders of atomic 
physics, Niels Bohr and Heisenberg, think in a thoroughly philosophical 
way…39 
It is hard to see what advantage philosophy could bring to science if the ontological 
distinction stands between them.  Heidegger’s claim that great scientists are also 
philosophers suggests that they do not respect the ‘ontological distinction’ in their 
practice.   
This modification would also give Lautman a reply to a criticism from one of his closest 
colleagues.  At a meeting in February 1939, Lautman insisted that the objectivity of 
mathematical theories depends on their participation in non-mathematical Ideas that 
dominate them.  Also present was Jean Cavaillès, who remarked, “Personally, I recoil 
from positing something else which would dominate the actual thought of 
mathematicians, I see necessity in the problems,…”40  Giving up the ‘ontological 
distinction’ would allow Lautman to reply that dialectical Ideas do indeed dominate 
mathematical theories, but the Ideas, the theories and the domination are all part of 
mathematical thinking.  Thus, talk of ‘domination’ notwithstanding, no extraneous 
constraint cramps the thought of mathematicians.41 
                                                 
39
 Heidegger 1993 p. 272 
40
 « Personnellement je répugne à poser une autre chose qui dominerait la pensée effective du 
mathématicien, je vois l’exigence dans les problèmes… » (p. 263). 
41
 I am grateful to Drs Corfield, Joll and Moyal-Sharrock for their careful reading of earlier versions of this 
paper. 
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